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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Data Science at the International 
Hellenic University. Pandemics are a critical problem in our society these days. Several 
technology solutions are used to confront this problem. One of them is contact tracing 
apps. These apps usually face data privacy issues. The latest European Union legislation 
for users’ data protection comes into conflict with the existing contact tracing apps.  The 
purpose of this study is the development of a contact tracing application that follows the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This application is designed with Block-
chain technology and it is deployed with python Django framework. Finally, this thesis 
evaluates the success rate of the app according to GDPR and further discusses challeng-
es that are rose during the development process. 
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In the last 100 years, we have faced many pandemic outbreaks, which resulted in world-
wide economic instability and social repercussions. Nowadays, the world is struggling to
contain the largest epidemic in decades. Due to the ever-increasing connectivity across
the world, infectious diseases pose significant threats to international travel. Large gath-
erings and larger populations have increased the chances of transmission from person to
person, country to country, and continent to continent. As a result of the highly transmis-
sible environment, constant disease surveillance is paramount. The first and maybe most
vital disease surveillance stage is the accurate and truthful reporting of all suspected and
confirmed cases.
An effective way to accurately report the spread of a pandemic is by contact tracing
apps. Cellphones contain all kinds of information about where users have been, what they
have been doing, and whom they have come in contact with. The use of mobile phones to
track disease has gone even further in recent years as a result of 86 percent of the world’s
population being connected to mobile coverage. There is a plethora of contact tracing apps,
which are developed with different technologies and they also use various ways to alarm
the users for the pandemic spread.
The University of Oxford estimates that approximately 60 percent of the population
would need to use a tracing app to stop an epidemic.[61] Diversely, a recent poll by Wash-
ington Post and University of Maryland found among Americans with smartphones that
only 40 percent said they were willing to use a contact tracing app citing distrust of big
tech companies. One possible way to increase app use is to find a balance between privacy
and technological surveillance. [52]
Contact tracing apps use a significant amount of users’ data. For this reason, devel-
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opers of these apps have to be very careful with the technologies used for this. More
specifically, in accordance with EU’s involvement with cyberspace [34], recent legislation
for protecting personal data in Europe (GDPR), which comes into force on May 25th of
2018, defines personal data as any information relating to an already identified individual
or data that can identify an individual either directly or indirectly. [77] As a result, the
information that a contact tracing app collects for a user comes against the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) because these data can be used to identify any person that
use this app.
The problem mentioned above could be bypassed with the use of blockchain technol-
ogy. Blockchains are incredibly popular nowadays. A blockchain is a distributed ledger
that is that is immutable and open to anyone. Once some data has been recorded inside a
blockchain, it becomes expensive to change due to the high computational power required
to do so. [59] Blockchain features include a distributed structure, auditability, immutabil-
ity, security, and anonymity. [20] However, there are considerable implications between
blockchain technology and GDPR legislation.
An Ethereum smart contract technology could provide a decentralized blockchain so-
lution for a secure contact tracing app database. Ethereum is an open software platform
based on blockchain technology that enables developers to build and deploy decentralized
applications known as Dapps. Smart contracts develop Ethereum dapps. A smart contract
is a computer program stored inside a blockchain as a cryptographic ”box”. More pre-
cisely, developers could deploy their dapps on sequences of logical expressions by using
a Turing-complete programming language, known as Solidity.[10]
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1.1 Problem description
This dissertation aims to declare the need for contact tracing in a pandemic crisis that
follows the EU legislation for data privacy. Blockchain technology is recommended as an
approach to the development of a contact tracing app.
Firstly, it is essential to note the usefulness of contact tracing apps during a pandemic.
For this purpose is presented a comprehensive literature review on contact tracing apps
that were already published in several countries. Moreover, it is a prerequisite to study the
structure of these applications by describing in detail their architecture and their technol-
ogy.
Next, as the blockchain is complicated as it is recently introduced in the technology
field, it is crucial to explain the critical elements. After presenting blockchain processes
and architecture, it is noteworthy to list the potential applies to this technology.
As soon as it concerns the EU legislation, theGDPR raises concerns about how blockchain
technology could follow this regulation. Consequently, there are substantial challenges that
need to bypass and be combined with possible solutions.
Finally, the architecture of the application will be designed based on the requirements
of the experiment and analyzed the tools used for it. Additionally, it is critical to specify
the effectiveness of the application and its weaknesses.
1.2 Dissertation guide
The dissertation is organized into seven sections. These are the introduction to the study,
the literature review that reports the two basic parts of the final solution, the technical
methodology that is followed for the experiment, and the conclusion and the recommen-
dations.
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Section one includes the introduction to the necessity of contact tracing in the era of
pandemics. Furthermore, it mentions how mandatory the compliance of contact tracing
application to the new GDPR legislation and proposes the smart contract blockchain tech-
nology as a possible solution.
Section two analyzes the contact tracing use by detailing a description of the system’s
architecture and technology. Moreover, it lists the existing contact tracing apps worldwide
and is discusses their strengths and their weakness.
Section three specifies the basic structure of a blockchain. It notes blockchain’s archi-
tecture, functionalities, and applications. It also enumerates the different types of blockchain.
In addition, it presents the challenges of blockchain and GDPR, and it proposes optimal
solutions. This section mentioned the existing approaches for contact tracing blockchain
applications.
Section four involves an extended description of Ethereum’s smart contract technology,
and it explores the technology tools that will be used in the experiment.
Section five provides a completed view of the application’s user interface for the hos-
pital’s view and the supplemental application for the tracing view. It also comments on the
programming code and its functionalities.
Section six discusses the results of the experiment. Furthermore, it mentions the chal-
lenges faced during the deployment of the application.
Finally, section 7 concludes how the solution proposed to the problem is the most effec-
tive. Moreover, the benefits and limitations of the app are listed. Lastly, there are several
suggestions for future work.
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2 Tracking needs inContagious pan-
demics
The development of mechanisms for efficiently controlling the spread of infectious dis-
eases is a significant part of mathematical epidemiology. Contact tracing is an important
tool for handling the extension of a pandemic. [54]
Contact tracing is a system that has been used for decades to stop infectious diseases. A
contact is anyonewho has had direct physical contact or was within onemeter for at least 15
minutes with an infected person even if that person does not have symptoms. The tracing
applies to anyone who has had contact from two days before a person gets sick. Once
an individual has been confirmed as a contact, the authority responsible for the spread of
the pandemic will be asked the contact to go into quarantine willingly. The conditions
mentioned above imply the separation from others for a particular time until it is clear that
the contact has not any sign of the illness.
Recently, the awareness about the impact of density on emerging highly contagious
infectious diseases has been increased. More specifically, dense areas are more compacted,
making them possible hotspots for the rapid pandemics transmission. [25] Contact tracing
could be used to provide valuable information to members of those crowded communities,
and it would prepare them to control the spread of a pandemic effectively. [16]
To sum up, contact tracing provides a plethora of solutions to the spread of an epi-
demic. Firstly, identifying and limiting contacts of people infected with the virus stops the
transmission, and the community stays safe. Sequentially, this tool helps epidemiologists
have a clearer view of how an epidemic is spreading. Lastly, scientists could also do more
accurate research with this valuable information to develop a more accurate solution for
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facing a pandemic.
2.1 Contact tracing apps
Contact tracing has been essential for fighting the spread of novel diseases. The architec-
ture of these apps and their functionalities are changing according to the country and its
legal system. Some countries have more rigorous regulations on privacy than others. [12]
[60]
2.1.1 System Architecture
There are three distinct architectures of contact tracing apps based on the privacy systems
and how personal data is stored on the server. Firstly, there is a centralized architecture
where data is concentrated in a server. Secondly, there is a decentralized architecture where
the data saved in the device of every individual. Finally, there is a hybrid architecture,
which is the combination of the architectures mentioned above. [3]
The examples illustrated below are a contact tracing app for the COVID19 virus that
led to the development of many contact tracing apps the last year.
Centralized
Figure 1 presents a centralized architecture model. It is a graphic representation of en-
tities and interactions in the Bluetrace protocol, which follows a centralized model. Blue-
trace protocol is used for contact tracing apps that are deployed with Bluetooth technology
to protect users’ data. [8] Firstly, the app requires the user to pre-register to the central
server. Sequentially, the server will provide a temporary ID(TempID) for every device
that will be encrypted with a secret key, and it will be sent to the device. These ids will be
exchanged between the devices that their users come in close contact with. Finally, when
a user willingly uploads his status after testing positive for a virus, the central server will
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alert the users with the TempID stored as contacts to the infected user.[3]
Figure 1: Tracing apps centralised architecture [3]
Figure 2 demonstrates the process that a user needs to follow to register in a centralized
architecture. After downloading the app and sign up by providing the necessary personal
information, the user needs to verify his mobile number by One Time Password (OTP)
procedure via SMS that the server sends. Subsequently, the server generates the TempID
for the user’s device.[3]
Figure 3 shows the exchange TempIDs procedure between users’ devices. The proce-
dure of exchange is implemented with the use of ”Encounter Message” and Bluetooth tech-
nology. The encounter message includes TempID, Phone Model, and Transmit Power(Tx-
Power). Also, the user’s device stores the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and
the timestamp of the message delivery. The Bluetrace protocol uses a blacklist method to
avoid duplicate records in the user’s device. This method blacklists encounter messages
that are already received from a contact’s device for a short time. [3]
Figure 4 details the execution path that the application follows after a user tests positive
for the virus. The clinician reports the user as infected to the server, and the server performs
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Figure 2: Centralised tracing app registration process [3]
an OTP procedure for verification that permits data to be stored. Sequentially, the server
located the encounter messages and TempIDs stored, it unencrypted them with the private
key and informed the clinician about the infected user’s contacts. Conclusively, the health
official notifies the suspected contacts. [3]
To sum up, in centralized architecture, the main procedures are executed from the cen-
tral server. The authorization that is given to the server by thιs architecture may cause
privacy issues.
Decentralized
Controversially, to the centralized architecture, the decentralized architecture intro-
duced a procedure where there is no central server with authority to implement the main
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Figure 3: Centralised tracing app contact exchange operation [3]
Figure 4: Centralised tracing app notification [3]
functionalities. More specifically, most of the decentralized contact tracing app processes
take place on the user’s device. This implementation secures the user’s data by generating
anonymous identifiers at the user devices and controlling the exchanged notifications on
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user devices instead of the centralized server. Figure 5 illustrated the Private Automated
Contact Tracing protocol (PACT) graphic representation, which is used to describe the
decentralized architecture structure. PACT is developed to improve the data privacy in
contact tracing apps during a pandemic by designing exposure detection functions imple-
mented in personal digital devices. [69]
At the decentralized approach, the pre-registration of the user is not required. By using
a pseudorandom function, devices generate seeds. Seeds combined with the current time
create privacy-preserving pseudonyms or ’chirps’ with a very short lifetime of about 1 min.
These chirps are transacted between users’ devices whenever they have contact.
Figure 5: Tracing apps decentralised architecture. [3]
Contact tracing apps designed as decentralized are not required to register users after
the installation process. It can be seen in figure 6 that after the app is installed on the
device, a random seed generation is deployed.
As mentioned above, the seed produced and the current time are consequently used in a
pseudorandom function to generate the chirp. The chirps are not connected to an individual
or their mobile device, so they are anonymous. In figure 7, it is depicted that chirps are
transmitted every few seconds via Bluetooth. The chirp received from the contact phone
is stored in the app accompanied by the timestamp that the chirp is exchanged and the
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Figure 6: Decentralised tracing app installation process. [3]
maximum Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) value. For avoiding the exchange of
chirps more than one time with the same contact, chirps that are received within 1 min, are
ignored.
After a user is tested positive for a virus, the procedure is that the health official will
give a unique ’permission number’ to the infected user, as shown in figure 8. This per-
mission will authorize the upload of used seeds recorded to the mobile device along with
the creation and expiration times of the seeds. In contrast to the centralized approach,
the server only receives the seeds linked to a single identified user in the decentralized
approach.
In conclusion, decentralized architecture executes the core tracing procedures locally
to devices of users. The central server is used only once per day to download infected indi-
viduals’ seeds to mobile devices. After downloading, the contact tracing app reconstructs
all the corresponding chirps.[3]
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Figure 7: Decentralised tracing app encounter exchange. [3]
Figure 8: Decentralised tracing app tracing process. [3]
Hybrid
There is also the hybrid architecture, which is a combination of centralized and de-
centralized. In the hybrid approach, the core functionalities are distributed in the server
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and the devices. While the risk analysis and notifications are remaining centralized, the
generation of TempID is performed decentralized.
Figure 9 illustrates the entities and the interactions of the Desire protocol. [11] User
registration is a requirement at this protocol to generate an Ephemeral ID (EphID) that
will be exchanged with the contact devices. After the transaction of EphID, the mobile
device produced and stored two unlinkable Private Encounter Tokens (PETs) to represent
the contact. By the time a user is reported by a health official as infected by the virus, the
PETs stored in the device are sent to the server. Any user can upload the second PET to
the server, which then performs risk analysis and notification.
Figure 9: Decentralised tracing app tracing process. [3]
Figure 10 presents the two-step authentication process through OTP that the user has
to follow after downloading the app to register. Thus, the server verified the app through
an authorization token and deleted the user’s phone number. Subsequently, the server
generates a unique ID and an encryption key to send to the app. Finally, the encryption
key is deleted from the server.
The mobile device forms an Ephemeral ID (EphID) by using the Diffie Hellman key
exchange mechanism. [18] The EphID is active for 15 min, and it is synchronized with
13
Figure 10: Decentralised tracing app tracing process. [3]
the Bluetooth MAC address rotation interval, as shown in Figure 11. Once the EmpID is
exchanged with another device, the app produces two PETs. These are stored in the two
tables that the app retains, one in the query table and the other in the upload table with the
contact’s time and duration.
Figure 12 details the process after a patient is tested positive for the virus. The user
uploads ID, encryption key, and PETs in the upload table along with time and duration
values willingly. Subsequently, the server maintains these PETs combined with data. The
use of the encryption key updates the values in the user’s record.
Whenever any user chooses to check their contacts for infected cases, the device up-
loads the PETs stored in the query table to the server. Next, the server iterates in the upload
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Figure 11: Decentralised tracing app tracing process. [3]
Figure 12: Hybrid tracing app notification process. [3]
table to find the PETs match from the query table. Thus, it performs a risk analysis based
on the time and duration values and notifies the user. It is essential to mention that the
server cannot identify any user by the PETs values.
In conclusion, Figure 13 presents the architecture distribution of the published contact
tracing apps worldwide. As we can see, most of the apps follow the decentralized architec-
ture, and less of them the Hybrid architecture. A significant percentage of the apps follow
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the centralized architecture, too.
Figure 13: Architecture distribution of contact tracing apps.
2.1.2 System Technology
Most of the contact tracing apps are developed with Bluetooth or Geo-location technology.
Figure 14 presents the distribution of these technologies in published applications.
Bluetooth
In contact tracing apps that have been developed with Bluetooth technology, the instal-
lation of the app is necessary. After the user came in contact with a virus carrier, who also
had installed the app, the application will store the information, and it will notify the user
about the risk. [73]
This technology has the following strengths:
• Bluetooth is more efficient in short proximity.
16
• Every device is anonymized by using a random key.
• The application works without any cellular data.
On the other hand, Bluetooth has significant limitations.
• The contacts of the user must have already installed the application.
• The user’s device is necessary to be a smartphone with a Bluetooth sensor.
• Bluetooth technology has privacy issues as it can be used as a portal to mobile device
data.
• This methodology can produce false-positive outcomes.
Location
No application is needed to be installed on the user’s device at the Geo-location type
of application. All the necessary information is collected via the SIM (Subscriber Identity
Module). At this approach, active government support is required. [73]
There are a plethora of advantages to the geo-location approach. The most significant
are the following:
• The user’s device does not have to be a smartphone. In addition, it is not essential
to have a Bluetooth sensor.
• SIM technology exists in every mobile phone. Thus, this type of contact tracing
refers to all mobile phone holders.
• The information about the location is always correct, and it is highly improbable to
fail.
• The number of false negatives is inconsiderable.
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There are also significant limitations to this contact tracing model.
• The user has to avoid sharing the mobile device with other users because the location
record will keep inaccurate data. As a result, the user may be notified about an
infectious contact that never really happened.
• The geo-location abides the same on every floor of a building.
Some applications are developed with both technologies. As shown in figure 14, they
cover a substantial piece in the market of contact tracing apps.
Figure 14: Technology distribution of contact tracing apps.
2.1.3 Applications
After the recent COVID19 pandemic, most countries are creating their contact tracing apps
to manage the spread of the virus. Most of the apps are centralized, and they combined
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both Bluetooth and location tracking technology. As figure 15 indicates, more than 50%
of the apps are used voluntarily by citizens.
Figure 15: Voluntarily distribution of contact tracing apps installing.
Below are some examples of countries which are currently utilizing contact tracing app
technology:
China
The Chinese government and Alipay developed Chinese applications. It uses location
technology for tracking. It is mandatory for citizens of China to download the contact
tracing app. Also, it is not specified whether the data collected from this application is used
only for contact tracing purposes and destroyed after the required time. The information




India established an application named Aarogya Setu. The app is designed with both
Bluetooth and location technology. Same as China, India made use of the app involuntary
for the citizens. The data is concentrated in a centralized server and is used only to protect
public health, but it is not mentioned clearly if the data is deleted after a certain time. There
is no anonymization of the users. [24]
Indonesia
PeduliLindungi is the contact tracing app of Indonesia. The Indonesian app uses users’
location data that is provided by telecommunications companies. Sequentially, the appli-
cation is centralized, and the data is gathered via Bluetooth and location technology. There
are significant privacy issues because it is not specified if the data is erased after its use or
analyzed for other purposes. It also voluntarily. [14]
Japan
COCOA is the app launched by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare of Japan.
Because of the plethora of issues, it has been suspended a couple of times. It is produced
with Bluetooth technology, and it is decentralized. There are no significant data privacy
issues because the data is removed after a determined amount of time, and it is only used
for the app. [37]
Mexico
Mexican government launched the CovidRadar, an application that is centralized and
is based on Bluetooth technology. The use of data apart from the application is unspeci-
fied, and there is not anonymization. Conclusively, privacy and data policies are question-
able.[81]
Philippines
Multisys Technologies Corporation developed the StaySafe application for the govern-
ment Philippines’ government, decentralized and used Bluetooth technology. The installa-
tion of the app is voluntary, and the users are not anonymized. The app has serious privacy
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concerns because it does not clearly mention the management of the data gathered on the
server. [15]
Vietnam
BlueZone, the contact tracing app of Vietnam, was designed with Bluetooth technol-
ogy. Although it has decentralized architecture, it requires access to contacts and other
media on mobile devices. Individuals that download the app remain anonymous to the
application’s data. Information that is concentrated on users’ behavior is not erased after
a short time. [75]
Germany
Deutsche Telekom and SAP launched the Corona-Warn-App for the German govern-
ment. The application was produced with Bluetooth technology. Despite the fact that the
first option was a centralized application, the government concludes with a decentralized
approach for privacy reasons. Data is anonymized and, after its use, deleted. [68]
Turkey
TurkishMinistry of Health created the contact tracing applicationHayat Eve Sığar. The
patients who detected positive for the virus must install the app on their mobile phones and
share it with the police. Subsequently, data is not anonymized. Even though the gath-
ered data erased after its use, it is not determined if it is consumed only for public health
purposes. [32]
Iran
The Sharif University of Technology in Iran developed a location technology appli-
cation, the AC19. The app is not mandatory for citizens. It is important to mention that
the app is forbidden by Google Play because it collected data that is not essential for con-
tact tracing. In addition, the application was transmitting real-time location that was not
anonymized to the state. [48]
France
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Although France negotiated with Apple and Google to develop the contact tracing ap-
plication, it completed with an application by the National Institute for Research in Digital
Science and Technology, Inria. TousAntiCovid is created with Bluetooth technology, and
it follows the decentralized architecture. There are no privacy issues because the applica-
tion is GDPR regulated. [53]
UK
NHS launched a COVID-19, Bluetooth, and decentralized contact tracing app in the
UK. The application secures users’ data by anonymization and deletion after its use. Ad-
ditionally, the app serves only public health purposes. [80]
Italy
Bending Spoons is the Italian company that is constructed the contact tracing app Im-
muni. The installation is voluntary for the residents. The application has no privacy issues
because it is used strictly for public health objectives, and data is anonymized. [43]
Poland
ProteGO is modeled after efforts in Singapore by the Ministry of Digital Affairs of
Poland. It is a Bluetooth application that follows a decentralized architecture. Users’ data
are secure by anonymization. [51]
Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Health and the Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority launched
two contact tracing applications. The first one, Tabaud, is modeled to allow citizens to
request ”movement permits” for mobility around the city. It is decentralized, and it uses
Bluetooth. The second one Tawakkalna is tracking the transmission of the virus. There is
limited information about the privacy issues of the app. In both applications, downloading
is not mandatory for the residents. [26]
Malaysia
MyTrace is a Bluetooth Malaysian app modeled by the Ministry of Science, Technol-
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ogy, and Innovation, and it is available voluntarily only on Android. The government has
announced to publish the open-sourcecode. The application is decentralized, and it does
not store anonymized data. Thus, the security of users’ data is problematic. [56]
Ghana
The Ministry of Communications, in partnership with iQuent Technologies Ascend
Digital Solution, has developed the GH COVID-19 Tracker App. It collects location data
of individuals that are not anonymized or destroyed when it is not used by the app anymore.
As a consequence, there are privacy issues in the app. The installation of the app is not
mandatory. The architecture of the app is not clearly mentioned. [71]
Australia
COVIDSafe is a Bluetooth, decentralized contact tracing application that is created
by the Australian government. Although collected data are used only for public health
reasons, they are anonymized and deleted after a determined amount of time. Australian
experts have criticized the government for an absence of transparency and unresponsive to
data privacy issues. [78]
Tunisia
Tunisia’s Observatory of Emerging Diseases constructed E7mi. The privacy policy of
data is not noticed precisely. It is known only that data is used for public health purposes,
and they are erased ever after. Although the app download is voluntary, the government
announced that it would remain voluntary so long as download rates remained high. [79]
Czech
The Czech Ministry of Health launches the eRouska app as part of the government’s
”smart quarantine” plan. It is a decentralized, Bluetooth application that follows all the
privacy rules that are compliant with GDPR. [27]
Hungary
The Hungary Ministry of Innovation and Technology and the NextSense company de-
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veloped VirusRadar. The application is optional. It is designed as centralized, and it col-
lects data via Bluetooth. The center server saves individuals’ contacts that last more than
2 minutes, and it drops them after 20 minutes. [29]
UAE
TraceCovid is a decentralized, Bluetooth application that is constructed by the Depart-
ment of Health. Citizens of the UAEmust install the app on their mobile devices otherwise
will be fined. The use of stored data is not specified clearly. Also, there is no anonymity.
[67]
Israel
HaMagen is the contact tracing app published by the Health Ministry of Israel. Be-
cause the application is using location technology based on GPS, officials supported is not
sufficiently accurate. The architecture is centralized. The central server is securing the
data by anonymization, and it is erased after its use. [65]
Austria
The Austrian app Stopp Corona launched by Red Cross was one of the first major
European nations to align with the Google/Apple API. The application is decentralized,
and it is working with Bluetooth technology. Data are processed only for public health
reasons, and they are anonymized. Moreover, the collected information is deleted after its
use. [4]
Switzerland
The first option of the Swiss National Covid-19 Science Task Force for the devel-
opment technology of SwissCovid was the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity
Tracing (DP-3T) instead of the Google/Apple API. Eventually, they used both technolo-
gies. Furthermore, data is gathering by Bluetooth. There are no privacy issues. [17]
Bulgaria
Scalefocus company created the ViruSafe, and it passed it to the Bulgarian Ministry.
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By using location technology, the application generates a map with possibly infected in-
dividuals. Even though the application requests users’ data, users’ identity is secure by
anonymity. The time limit that data is deposited in the centralized server is undefined.
[35]
Thailand
Digital Government Agency of Thailand launched a decentralized appMorChana. The
application combined the proximity contact tracing app with a QR code check-in system,
called Thai Chana. The privacy of the data that is gathered by Bluetooth and location is
not specified in detail. [28]
Singapore
Government Technology Agency launched the first major Bluetooth contact tracing
app. Furthermore, the BlueTrace protocol is introduced by TraceTogether. The installation
of the app is mandatory for Singapore’s citizens. The architecture is centralized. [41]
Finland
The Finnish government approved the development of the Koronavilkku contact trac-
ing app by the Communicable Diseases Act. The application is voluntary and free. The
data is gathered via Bluetooth technology. [50]
Norway
Smittestopp is a centralized application that was published by the Norwegian Institute
of Public Health. Although it was notified that data is received only for public health pur-
poses, Norway withdrew the app and destroyed all user data because of security concerns
and criticisms. [57]
Ireland
In contrast to the neighboring UK, Ireland opted to use the Google/Apple API that
is based on Bluetooth technology. Covid Tracker is decentralized, and Ireland’s Health
Services launch it. The application secures users’ data with anonymization. Data also
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erased after a determined amount of time. [44]
New Zealand
New Zealand’s Ministry of Health created a centralized contact tracing app with Blue-
tooth technology. NZ COVID Tracer is premised on a check-in system using QR codes in
public areas. The privacy policies for user’s data are not specified accurately. [30]
Kuwait
Shlonik is a centralized contact tracing app that is developed by Kuwait’s Ministry of
Health. The application concentrated data based on individuals’ real-time location. An
Amnesty International report highlighted this app as one of the most invasive in the world.
[70]
Qatar
Ehteraz is a contact tracing app that is designed with both Bluetooth and location tech-
nology. The Ministry of Public health publishes it. The application requires access to pho-
tos and is not voluntary. In addition, it is detected a security hole in the database scheme.
[66]
North Macedonia
NorthMacedonia uses the StopKorona contact tracing app that is developed NectSense
company like Hungary’s app. It is decentralized, and it is collecting data via Bluetooth.
[36]
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has closed a deal with the same developer as Ireland’s app. Stop-
COVID NI is a decentralized, Bluetooth application. There is not sufficient information
about data security. [9]
Bahrain
The Information and eGovernment Authority of Bahrain designed a centralized appli-
cation that is gathering data without anonymization. BeAware is voluntary. As a result,
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the number of downloads is not more than 25% in the country. [7]
Estonia
HOIA, the Estonian contact tracing app is developed with DP-3T and Bluetooth tech-
nology borrowed by Google/Apple API. The app’s development resulted from Bytelogics,
Cybernetica, Fujitsu Estonia, Guardtime, Icefire, Iglu, Mobi Lab, Mooncascade, and Vel-
vet corporation. For data collection is selected the decentralized approach. [38]
Cyprus
CovTracer is the Cypriot contact tracing app launched by the Research Centre of Ex-
cellence on Information and Communication Technologies (RISE). It is collecting data via
real-time location, and it is storing them anonymized. Although there is no policy about
the use of the data. [35]
Fiji
Fiji Government and digitalFiji company published CareFiji. The application is devel-
oped according to the Singapore TraceTogether. It is a decentralized Bluetooth app. There
is no privacy policy for users’ data. [1]
Iceland
Iceland opted not to use Bluetooth because the results may be inaccurate and instead
utilizes location technology. Rakning C-19 is a contact tracing apps designed with both
decentralized and centralized architecture, a hybrid approach. Individual data are secured
and deleted after their use. [31]
Gibraltar
Beat Covid Gibraltar is launched by the HMGovernment of Gibraltar and the Gibraltar
Health Authority. The installation is voluntary, and it is only downloaded from more than
25% of the population. The application is decentralized, and it gathers data via Bluetooth.
Data are secured and erased after a determined amount of time. [7]
Algeria
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There is no accurate information about Algeria’s contact tracing app. It is important to
mention that Amnesty International was examined the application for breach of personal
data. [62]
Belgium
Coronalert is Belgium’s contact tracing app that is designed according to Germany’s
Corona-Warn app. Interfederal Committee for Testing and Tracing publishes it. The ap-
plication is decentralized. The data gathered anonymously via Bluetooth, so there are no
security issues. [64]
Canada
Both Shopify and Blackberry introduce COVID Alert for the Canadian government.
Firstly, it is launched in 8 provinces and territories. Companies developed the application
by the use of Google/Apple API and Bluetooth technology. The architecture is decentral-
ized. The collected data are secured. [62]
Denmark
Denmark published Smittestopp, a decentralized and Bluetooth application. Although
documentation notifies that data is anonymized and secure, authorities asked for temporary
deactivation of its use and deleting the collected data. [2]
To sum up, figure 16 presents the number of downloads for each application. Notably,
most of the apps are facedwith data privacy issues. As a result, some of them are deprecated
after a call from local authorities or Amnesty International.
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Figure 16: Number of users per contact tracing app
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3 Blockchain technology
A blockchain is introduced firstly in 2008 and applied in 2009. The first application of
blockchain is the ”bitcoin”, a decentralized peer-to-peer digital currency, with no govern-
ment to issue it. No banks are needed to manage accounts and verify transactions. [55]
Even thoughBitcoin cryptocurrency is themost popular blockchain application, blockchain
can be used for various applications apart from cryptocurrencies.
3.1 Blockchain architecture
Blockchain could be mentioned as a public ledger, in which all committed transactions are
stored in a chain of blocks. This chain continuously expands when new blocks are added
to it. Figure 17 presents the blockchain architecture of a sequence of blocks. [55] Each
block points directly to the previous one via a reference that is a hash value of the previous
block called parent block. The first block in a blockchain is called the genesis block.[84]
Figure 17: A blockchain architecture with sequence of blocks [83]
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3.1.1 Blocks
The data that is stored inside a block depends on the type of blockchain. For example,
the Bitcoin blockchain stores the details about a transaction in blocks, such as the sender,
receiver, and amount of coins. [63] It can be seen in Figure 18 that the block is separated
into two parts the block header and the block body.
The block header has the following values:
• Block version: Indicates which set of block validation rules to follow.
• Parent block hash : Every block in a blockchain contains the hash of the previous
block. This technique effectively creates a chain of blocks, and it is this technique
that makes a blockchain.
• Merkle tree root hash: Hash identifies a block and all of its contents, and it is unique.
A hash is generated when a block is created, and when the block contents change,
the hash of the block also changes. If a single block changes, it will make all the
following blocks invalid.
• Timestamp: Current timestamp as seconds since 1970-01-01T00:00 UTC
• nBits: Current hashing target in a compact format [84]
• Nonce: A 4-byte field, which is a counter used to make sure each transaction can
only be processed once [10]
The block body contains the transaction counter and transactions. Every block can
contain a finite number of transactions that depend on the block size. [84]
Last but not least, an asymmetric cryptography mechanism is used to validate the au-
thentication of transactions.[47] Every block contains a digital signature that is used to
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Figure 18: Block structure [83]
sign the transactions. More specifically, a private and public key is provided to each user,
and the private key signs the transaction. The Bitcoin digital signature is shown in Figure
19.[21]
3.1.2 Key characteristics of blockchain
The blockchain technologies are composed of key characteristics.
Decentralization
In contrast to centralized transaction systems that each transaction needs to be vali-
dated through a central authority, blockchain does not have to rely on a centralized node
anymore. The data can be recorded, stored, and updated distributedly. Thus, blockchain
can significantly reduce server costs. [84] [47]
Open Source
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Figure 19: Bitcoin digital signature [21]
Blockchain technologies such as Hyperledger and Ethereum are open to everyone to
create any application. [47]
Autonomy
Each node on the blockchain network transfers or updates data safely as a result of
consensus. The consensus is based on trust between a single person and the whole system.
[47] [84]
Immutability
Records that are stored in a blockchain are unchangeable. This condition only could
change if someone can take control of more than 51% of a node simultaneously. [47]
Anonymity
The Blockchain network gives each user the ability to interact with it by generated
addresses. As a result, transactions can be anonymous, and a user could generate as many
addresses as he wants to avoid the exposure of his identity. [47] [84]
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Transparent
The data of every node in a blockchain is transparent. This characteristic leads to the
democratization of blockchain data, and it makes the blockchain trusted.
Persistency
Transactions in a blockchain network are distributed in blocks. Also, each block is
added to the blockchain after other nodes validate it.
Auditability
Users can trace the previous records of the blockchain network because of every trans-
action record with a timestamp.
3.1.3 Consensus
The consensus is the name for a group of algorithms that can create a voting process
for the network. This voting process helps make decisions about the information on the
blockchain. The consensus is known as a solution for the Byzantine Generals Problem.
[22] In a distributed system, a consensus is a way to ensure trust between users without
any communication between them.
3.1.4 Proof of Work
Bitcoin introduced an innovative way of using Proof-of-Work as a consensus algorithm to
validate transactions and broadcast new blocks to the blockchain. Proof of work is costly
or time-consuming to produce a piece of data but simple for others to verify the correct
solution under precise requirements. There is an upfront cost of resources known as work
to generate a block’s hash value in proof of work. The rest of the network can easily
validate this work to check if it was done correctly. The proof of work algorithm achieves
consensus without a central authority. [47]
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In addition, each node is involved in solving a problem meant to prove they have done
some required work. Nodes who attempt to solve the problem are known as miners. These
miners are always in a race to solve each problem as quickly as possible to build the next
block. In return for their time and resources, they are paid transaction fees directly from
the users making the transactions. They are also awarded by the network with Bitcoins
explicitly created as a reward for mining the new block. These new coins that are created
are the only way new coins are ever introduced to the system. Miners are trying to find the
nonce for every new block. When creating a hash for a block, not just any value will work.
The system requests a particular hash value that starts with a certain number of zeros. These
extra constraints make the hash much more challenging to generate. Computers guess the
nonce repeatedly until they finally come up with a value that gives us a hash that meets
these constraints. Figure 20 presents a Proof of work mining diagram.
Furthermore, proof of work calculations requires a lot of computing power. All this
computing comes at a cost both financially and to the environment. [47] Another problem
in proof of work algorithm is the minor monopoly problem. Bitcoin miners that control a
majority of the network dedicate more resources. As a result, they can validate the blocks
according to their wish.
3.1.5 Proof of Stake
One very successful consensus algorithm is known as Proof of Stake. Proof of stake is
a consensus algorithm that seeks to achieve consensus by giving a vote to those with the
stake. In this case, stake means those who have the most investment in a positive outcome
for this system. These users are considered the most likely to vote on making a positive
impact on or improvement of the system.
In the proof of stake consensus protocol, Instead of miners, there are validators. These
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Figure 20: The state diagram of a miner in the original PoW.[39]
validators do not need to invest in computing equipment to mine the blocks that create
coins because all the coins exist from the outset. Instead, the purpose of these validators,
also known as stakeholders, is to determine which block makes it onto the blockchain. In
order to validate transactions and create blocks, validators put up their coins as stake. If
they validate a fraudulent transaction, they lose their holdings and their right to participate
as a validator in the future. This check incentivizes the system to validate only truthful
transactions. In proof of stake, the greater the fraction of the total coins a validator owns,
the higher their chances of being picked to create the next block because they have a higher
stake. If a validator’s block is added, the validator will be awarded coins proportional to
the amount of their bet. Figure 21 is illustrated consensus processes in proof of stake.
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Figure 21: Illustrations of several PoS consensus processes.[58]
3.2 Types of Blockchain
There are three different types of blockchain, public, private, and consortium. The type of
blockchain depends on the privacy of the information contained in blocks.
3.2.1 Public blockchain
The transactions can be verified and checked by all users. A public blockchain is decentral-
ized. Bitcoin and Ethereum are public blockchain networks. [47] Every node in blockchain
has access to public blockchain information.
3.2.2 Consortium blockchain
Consortium blockchain can be seen as partly decentralized, and it usually used for busi-
ness to business transactions. The data that is stored in blocks can be public or private.
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Hyperledger and R3CEV are consortium blockchains. [47]
3.2.3 Private blockchain
Data in a private blockchain is not accessible publicly but only from authorized users. [47]
Private blockchain is protected frommalicious users, and the identity of users that are doing
the transactions is known.
3.3 Application of Blockchain
Blockchain technologies can be applied in the industry of finance but also other applica-
tions.
• Cryptocurrency: Bitcoin is the first implemented example of cryptocurrency, and
it is an entirely digital currency. It is independent of government systems and banks.
Bitcoin uses a method of encryption in order to transfer funds. Additionally, it man-
aged public keys for bitcoin transactions. [47]
• Smart Contract: Asmart contract is a computer program stored inside a blockchain.[33]
They are immutable, and they are distributed. In a smart contract, users can store
their data in all acceptable forms that any programming language permits.
• Hyperledger: Hyperledger is an open-source, collaborative effort created to advance
cross-industry blockchain technologies. It is a global collaboration hosted by The
Linux Foundation, including leaders in finance banking, Internet of Things, sup-
ply chains manufacturing, and technology. It is a framework to create, deploy, and
maintain blockchains for businesses that ensure accountability, transparency, and
trust among business partners. Hyperledger is a software used to create personal-
ized blockchain service.
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3.4 Blockchain and GDPR
The rapid development of cloud computing technology and the massive storage of users’
data from online services erase the concern for a valuable legislation system that will pro-
tect the European Union citizens’ data. Personal data is all the information that reveals the
identity of a person directly or indirectly. These data include IP addresses, cookies, digital
fingerprinting, and geolocation. [23] As a result, European Union introduced the General
Data Protection Regulation(GDPR) on the 25th of May 2018, which offers users of on-
line services the opportunity to control the provision of their data in several companies’
databases. [74]
The GDPR has six general data protection principles: [23]
• Fairness and lawfulness principle requires that an organization collects personal data
fairly and transparently. In addition, organizations have to inform the users about
the exact reason their data is collected and the purpose. Furthermore, the data cannot
be used against a person in any way.
• Purpose limitationwhich prevents organizations from collecting more personal data
than needed for specific data processing.
• Data minimization determines how the data is processed. Personal data have to be
used only for the processing mentioned in the agreement with users, and they cannot
be used for other purposes.
• Accuracy requires personal data to be accurate and up to date. Differently, if data
are incorrect or misleading, they must immediately be fixed or deleted.
• Storage limitation states that personal data can be saved only for as long as needed
to fulfill the service that it was agreed. After the service or contract ends the data
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must be removed or anonymized.
• Integrity and confidentiality obligates personal data is secure against hackers, unau-
thorized users, or accidental data leakage.
The decentralized nature of blockchain could be an effective solution toGDPR-compliant
personal data management. [76]
3.4.1 Challenges
There are three law articles in the GDPR that are problematic in blockchain use. These are
article 16 is about the right to rectification, article 17 about the right to be forgotten, and
article 18 about the processing restriction.[77]
Article 16 gives the right to correct the data that someone has about an individual. The
user has the right to change existing data that companies have about him, and he can also
add new data if he claims that the current data is inaccurate or incomplete. The problem
faced with blockchain from the above article is the difficulty of changing the data.[77]
Article 17 gives the right to be forgotten. Blockchain does not permit the removal of
the data. As a result, EU citizens cannot exercise their right to delete their data. As a result,
blockchains cannot comply with the GDPR. [77]
Moreover, Article 18 gives the right to prevent companies from doing something with
the user’s data. An exception to the article above is when the data is inaccurate or if it
was illegally collected. This article’s issue is that most blockchains are completely open,
allowing anyone to take a copy of all the data stored and using it for any purpose. So there
is no control over who is processing the data.[77] [13]
3.4.2 Solutions
There are several ways to solve the challenges presented above.
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Firstly, the problemmentioned in articles 16 and 17 could be solved by storing personal
data somewhere other than a blockchain like a secure server where there will be accessible
only to read and write. Then a reference of the data will be stored on the blockchain like a
shortcut or pointer.
On the other hand, this solution does not comply with blockchain’s decentralized nature
because an external server is used. This issue could be bypassed with zero-knowledge
proof, which permits the transaction participants to prove the knowledge to each other
without revealing any additional information about the knowledge. [45]
Finally, a solution for Article 18 of the GDPR would be to store the personal data in
a permissioned blockchain instead of a public one. In contrast to public blockchains that
allow anyone to see the data stored inside of them, permissioned blockchains provide a
secure way for a group of entities to exchange information, know and identify each other
when there is not fully trust between them. [5] [72]
3.5 Blockchain applications in pandemics for tracking purposes
One of the first examples of a contact tracing app with blockchain technology is presented
in the Beeptrace protocol [82]. This approximation is based on the users’ geolocation
tracking after the user uploads the day’s geodata, the server checks in the blockchain for
possible contacts based on nodes’ geolocation uploads.
Another solution is described in [49]. This approach suggests the update of the blockchain
by a limited number of nodes. As they named in the research, several oracles are updating
the blockchain with the condition of the patients. Finally, the application creates dash-
boards with graphs that describe the overall knowledge resulting from the blocks’ infor-
mation.
An also interesting approach to this issue has been proposed by [6] approach. In this
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example, every user of the application is a node in the blockchain. Each infected user
uploads everyday contacts. Thus, every node in the blockchain can check if it comes in
contact with an infected individual.
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4 Methodology
4.1 Ethereum technology and smart contracts
Ethereum is an open-source, programmable public blockchain platform. It includes its
scripting language known as Solidity and has an entirely separate ecosystem of tools. The
Etheruem Virtual Machine(EVM) is capable of executing logic, algorithm, and process
data inputs. In an Ethereum environment, a user can create their operations. These opera-
tions can vary in complexity, which by design gives room for creating several decentralized
applications, including cryptocurrencies and tokens. Moreover, a developer can write an
application using a programming language call solidity modeled after Python, JavaScript,
and submitted to an EVM for execution. ”Ether” is the cryptocurrency of Ethereum, and
is used to pay transaction fees.
Ethereum accounts contain the following information:
• The nonce, a counter is used to ensure that there will not be duplicated transactions
in the blockchain.
• Account balance which represents the number of ether.
• Contract code, a unique hash code for each contract
• Storage of the account which is empty in default.
Smart contracts on Etherium are programs that can be run on the Ethereum network.
These programs are deployed to the entire network, and all participating nodes verify each
call to a smart contract. This procedure allows for trusted parties to participate in complex
financial contracts without any third-party supervision. Numerous projects are working
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on prediction markets that allow anyone to bet on a future event and be paid out if their
prediction was correct without any central authority. Other projects are working on loans,
where anyone worldwide can request or offer funds for a loan entirely from a decentralized
smart contract. These smart contracts will exist and be executable so long as the network
exists.
Etherium, however, is the first blockchain to have implemented a smart contracts plat-
form. In comparison to bitcoin scripts, Ethereum smart contracts are Turing Complete.
The versatility for what is smart contracts can be used for has resulted in vastly different
developer ecosystems compared to Bitcoin. The Ethereum developer ecosystem is rich in
Turing and open-source projects. Many projects and entire companies emerged, with their
core tech being built on Ethereum smart contracts.[10]
4.2 Technology
This experiment is using the Django framework. Django is a web development frame-
work that is commonly used for information systems. It is open-source, and it uses python
programming language in the backend. Additionally, for the deployment of a web con-
tact tracing app in the framework, we used HTML5, CSS3, and javascript programming
languages. [19]
Furthermore, for the blockchain part of the application, we used the Ethereum platform.
The Solidity programming language is used for the development of the smart contract.
The IDE used for developing the smart contract is named Remix, an open-source web and
desktop application. In Remix, the user can test the execution correctness of the deployed
contract. [40]
Besides, It is selected the truffle framework. Truffle is a growth, testing, and asset
pipeline framework for Ethereum, which contains several features. One of the features
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Figure 22: List of fake accounts in the terminal
is Ganache, which is used for fake account generation in the Ethereum platform. Every
account has 100 ETH that is consumed in every transaction in the smart contract. Figure
22 displayed the hash code for every fake account in the Ganache framework and their
private keys. It is also mentioned the amount of ETH in each account. [42]
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4.3 Graphic representation of the experiment
The application of the experiment is designed according to hybrid architecture. A chosen
centralized server and a decentralized blockchain in Ethereum is used. The tracing in the
application is succeeded via the location of infected individuals.
Figure 23: Health official view in application
In figure 23 is illustrated the first part of the use of the application. The health official
completes a patient form with the patient’s information and his condition. The patient’s
data are stored in the hospital’s central server and blockchain.
The patient’s data flow is presented in figure 24. According to this, all patients’ data
accompanied by doctor’s notes are stored in a secure hospital database. At the same time,
the postal code, country, the status of the patient (Infected, Suspected, Cured) are appended
in a blockchain. Finally, to satisfy GDPR requirements, a hashing is generated and saved
in both the central database as a primary key and blockchain as an id.
From a user perspective, the information streams are between the contact tracing web
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Figure 24: Store data in database and blockchain
application and the blockchain. The user searches about infected people in the area based
on postal code, country, and city. The app requests the blockchain. Each user search
interacts only with the public blockchain of Ethereum. There is no interaction with the
hospital’s database to avoid privacy issues. The process is shown in figure 25.
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Figure 25: Retrieve data from blockchain
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5 Experiment and deployment
The application’s development started from the web application part where the data stored
in the central database. Firstly, it is designed the user interface. The web application is
designed for hospitals which are taking part in virus tracing. Also, there is a supplementary
application that is used by individuals for the tracing of the infected people in the search
area.
5.0.1 Application for hospitals
After the health official logged in to the website, the home page presented two options, the
Add Patients button and the Patients list button. The same choices are shown in the navbar
under the Options link, too. Figure 26 below shows the home page of the user.
Figure 26: Home page
After the user clicks on the Add Patients button, the application leads him to the pa-
tient’s form page, as is shown in figure 27 and 28. In the form, the health officer fills
the name, the surname, the status (infected, suspected, cured), the location information
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Figure 27: Patient’s form part 1
Figure 28: Patient’s form part 2
(address, country, city, region, postal code), the phone number, the date, the email, and
supplementary notes for the patient’s condition.
The second option of the user is the Patients list button. The application request from
the central server the number of patients that are stored in its database. Every hospital has
its user. Sequentially, each user has access to its database and not to every patient stored
in the blockchain.
Figure 29 illustrates the view of the patient’s list. We can see that the list contains the
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Figure 29: Patient’s list
name, the surname, the status, the date, and the notes of each patient. The notes are shown
after the user selects the plus symbol in the first column of the table. Furthermore, there
are edit button and delete button. The functionality of the edit button updates the record of
the user. The red delete button deletes the patient from the local database.
5.0.2 Application for tracing
The application which is used for the tracing part does not require login from the users. It
is a simple search page where every individual could complete the city, the country, and
the postal code and get infected people in the search area. Figure 30 displays the search
page application. As mentioned above, the search page interacts only with the blockchain
to calculate the search results.
5.1 Blockchain code analysis
The smart contract is developed in the Remix IDE Ethereum platform, as mentioned above.
In listing 1, it is mentioned the assignment of the variables in the contract:
• Statuses: Enum is a type of variable that the user defines. We created Statuses as a
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Figure 30: Search page of tracing app
variable that takes values zero, one, and two, performed as Infected, Suspected and
Cured values.
• currentStatus: It is a Statuses type of variable that defined above.
• Patient: A struct is another custom type of variable defined by the user. Structs
are a group of several associated properties determined by the same name. In our
application, the Patient struct is determined by the variables below:
– postal: The postal code of the patient’s living area is assigned in a string vari-
able.
– hospitalName: In this string variable assigned the hospital name, the patient is
diagnosed.
– hashing: A string variable that represents the hashing generated by the patient’s
name and surname.
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– country: The country where the patient lives permanently is assigned in a string
variable.
– status: Statuses type of variable that assigned the condition of the patient. It
takes values 0 for infected, 1 for Suspected, and 2 for Cured patients.
• patients: A list that saves each patient in the blockchain.
Listing 1: Solidity variables
enum Statuses { Infected, Suspected, Cured }
Statuses currentStatus;
Patient patient;









The function addPatient that is specified by Solidity code in listing 2, it is used for
adding patients in the list patients of the smart contract. The function adds Patient objects
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in the list defined by status, postal, hospitalName, hashing, and country variables. The
function returns the current number of elements in the list.
Listing 2: The function addPatient
function addPatient(Statuses _status, string memory _postal, string
memory _hospitalName, string memory _hashing, string memory
_country) public returns(uint) {




The function getPatientsCount calculates the number of entries in the patient list. It
is important to notify that the patient list is common for every hospital account in the
application. Thus, the number returned each time the function is called is corresponding
in entries of all hospitals.
Listing 3: The function getPatientsCount
function getPatientsCount() public view returns(uint) {
return patients.length;
}
The last function of the contract is getPatient. It is a simple getter taken as an input the
index of patients list and returns the corresponding Patient object. The code of the function
is presented in listing 4.
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Listing 4: The function getPatient
function getPatient(uint index) public view returns (Patient memory) {
return patients[index];
}
5.2 Blockchain connection with python and Django framework
After developing the application user interface and smart contract, it is essential the con-
nection of smart contract with the application. The app is constructed in python so, it is
added to the source code theWeb3.py library. The original API is in Javascript (Web3.js).
The library is designed to interact with smart contracts for the execution of transactions.
These transactions are achieved by calling the contract’s functions in our main application.
The functions that presented below are not complete. The entire python code presented in
the Appendix section.
Listing 5 presents the encryption function that generates the hashing from the user’s
name and surname. It is used the encoding algorithm SHA 256, which is the algorithm that
is utilized within the Bitcoin network for mining and creation of Bitcoin addresses. The
function takes as an input a string value, and it returns a hashing string value.




Firstly, the application has to connect with the Ethereum blockchain network and smart
contract. For the connection, we used the Ganache framework that creates fake Ethereum
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accounts for testing. The web3 API connects to the HTTP provider that, in our case, is
the localhost. In addition, in ABI variable is assigned the contract’s Application Binary
Interface that is resulting after the contract is compiled. Furthermore, the address of the
contract is needed to complete the connection. This value is assigned in the address string
variable. The contract variable stores the connection. The implementation with the python
code is presented in listing 6.
Listing 6: The connection of smart contract with python application
ganache_url = 'http://127.0.0.1:8545'
web3 = Web3(Web3.HTTPProvider(ganache_url))
abi = json.loads(JSON format for a ’contracts interface)
address = "0x#######################"
contract = web3.eth.contract(address = address, abi = abi)
Next, the function add_patients in the web application is used to add patients to the
hospital’s central server and blockchain. The function with web3 API calls the addPatient
function of the smart contract. The blockchain transaction seceded by added the public key
of the Ethereum account, which is a hashing code. In listing 7 is shown only the python
code that makes the connection to the blockchain.
Listing 7: The Web3 use in adding patients function
def add_patients(request):
result = contract.functions.addPatient(status, postal,
str(precord.user), encrypt_string(name_surname),
country).transact({'from':'0x##############'})
Similarly, the delete_patient function update the blockchain. As is already mentioned
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above, the blockchain is immutable. If one of the blocks is deleted, the blockchain is
becoming invalid. Sequentially, deletion of a patient is not possible in the blockchain. For
this purpose, the function updates the blockchain by using addPatient, and it takes in the
hospital name input the word ”delete”. It is using as identification of the hashing value that
is generated by the patient’s name and surname. Listing 8 contains only the python code
for the web3 API connection.
Listing 8: The the Web3 use in deleting patients function
def delete_patient(request, uid):
result = contract.functions.addPatient(status, postal, 'deleted',
str(hashing), country).transact({'from':'0x##############'})
Listing 9 describes the code of update_patient_status function. It is acts like the delete_pa-
tient function. The only difference is in the the inputs which are the same as add_patients
function.
Listing 9: The the Web3 use in updating patients function
def update_patient_status(request, uid):
result = contract.functions.addPatient(status, postal,
str(patient.user), str(patient.hashing),
country).transact({'from':'0x##############'})
Lastly, it is developed a supplementary application for individuals who search for in-
fected people in the area. The function that is used for this purpose is named search_results.
In the function is called the getPatientsCount and the result is assigned in the variable
no_patients. Subsequently, the number no_patients is used to set the range of iterations
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needed to find the infected individuals. The iteration takes place in the blockchain via get-
Patient function of smart contract. The result is saved in the list lpatient. In the list, lhash
is stored the unique, valid hash values of the infected people. The number is saved on a
counter. The full code is presented in listing 10.





message = 'No infected people'
counter = 0
for i in range(0, no_patients):
patients = contract.functions.getPatient(i).call()
lpatient = list(patients)
if lpatient[0] == 0 and lpatient[1] == postal and lpatient[4]
== country:
if lpatient[3] not in lhash and lpatient[2] != 'deleted':
lhash.append(lpatient[3])
counter = counter + 1
message = 'Infected people in your area are'
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6 Results and discussion
Nodes add the blocks in blockchains. More specifically, the blockchain cannot be created
by users that not be part of the distributed network. As a result, there are two options for
the development of the blockchain contact tracing app. The application could be produced
as user-centered. Thus, every user must be part of the Ethereum network to use the app.
The user also needs to have an amount of Ethereum in the digital wallet to pay for each
transaction made by the smart contract. The second option is more optimal for our exper-
iment, and it needs fewer resources because it is based on fewer Ethereum accounts that
will add blocks to the blockchain. Furthermore, users do not charge. More specifically,
every hospital is a node of the blockchain network, and it performs all transactions by their
accounts.
Furthermore, this experiment used blockchain to leverage the pseudonymity that blockchain
technology provides. Consequently, the final application will be secure and GDPR regu-
lated because the patients could not identify the information stored in the public blockchain.
As mentioned above, the nodes in this blockchain are each hospital that uses the web app.
Sequentially, the patient’s pseudonymity is provided by the application before the informa-
tion is uploaded to the blockchain. The patient’s name and surname generate this hashing.
It is stored both in the blockchain and central server of each hospital.
As mentioned in the Methodology section, the delete and update commands could not
be used in the immutable blockchain technology. These procedures are accomplished by
updating the blockchain with the delete information that defines the deletion and changing
the information with the same hash code to identify the same patient.
Moreover, the GDPR challenges are faced effectively by the experiment’s application.
The use of central secure hospitals’ servers that save the data and are accessed only to read
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and write is the optimal solution proposed above for GDPR articles 16 and 17. Addition-
ally, the blockchain is using the hashing as a pointer to this data. On the other hand, the
application’s design failed to comply with the regulation in article 18. Because of the app’s
decentralized nature, data are public, and everyone can have a copy. The most significant
part of GDPR is the anonymity of the data. In the application, the identity of the users is
stored in the secure hospital’s server and the data that are published in the blockchain are
anonymous by the use of hashing that the application generates.
Finally, it is essential to compare the already existing blockchain technology contact
tracing approaches with this experiment. In contrast to the existing applications designed
by the decentralized approach, the experiment application is created based on a hybrid
architecture. Thus, the application is GDPR regulated. Furthermore, the experiment does
not use geodata or contact data from individuals that used the app.
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7 Conclusion
A blockchain technology approach is proposed to solve the GDPR legislation issues in
contact with tracing apps for pandemics. Introduced the Blockchain technology and its
use. Described the architecture of the existing contact tracing applications and their func-
tionality. Detailed the methods that are followed and the technologies that are used for
the development. Explained challenges that are faced during the design of the application
and they the optimal solutions are discussed. The differences in the application with the
already published approaches are presented. In conclusion, the application is tested for its
compliance with the GDPR legislation and strengths and weaknesses of the application are
mentioned.
7.1 Benefits and limitations
During this project, several approaches are studied on the possible solutions to the prob-
lem. The analysis of the existing solutions in contact tracing developed with and without
blockchain technology gave a clear view of the final application structure.
The application’s hybrid architecture could solve more than half of GDPR issues in
blockchain technology. The application compounded a hospital information system with a
contact tracing app approach without arising privacy issues to the data. With this solution
is avoided the falsely spread of the data to unauthorized users.
On the other hand, there are limitations to the solution that is proposed. It is already
noted that the application cannot solve the problem faced in the GDPR about the users
asked for permanent deletion from the blockchain. Additionally, the application is not
tested for the user experienced, and it is not designed in detail its user interface because of
limited time. Another issue is that the security of the central server in hospitals is taken as
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a prerequisite. This issue has to be analyzed in more depth before installing the application
and has to be covered with any cybersecurity issues.
7.2 Recommendations for future work
This study succeeded in developing a different approach to blockchain contact tracing an
application using a hybrid architecture. However, some aspects did not take into account
during the process because of the lack of time.
An interesting approach for further investigation could be a complete decentralized
application based only on a private blockchain. Therewere no privacy issues in this specter,
and there is no need to store data in a centralized database.
Moreover, suppose blockchain technology is adopted for contact tracing in EU coun-
tries. In that case, it is essential to solve the problem presented in the GDPR article about
every individual’s right within the EU to be forgotten. So, it has to study the potential
solution with the use of a permissioned blockchain that is mentioned in section 4.
Finally, the application could be developed in a mobile version and be combined with
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A Appendix
Listing 11: Python class views.py for hospital application
from django.shortcuts import render
from django.template import loader
from django.http import HttpResponse
from django.shortcuts import render, redirect
from .models import Patient
from django.contrib import messages
import pandas as pd
from django.contrib.auth.decorators import login_required
















dt = pd.read_csv('contact/static/info/countries.txt', sep='\n')
countries = []
df = dt.to_dict()
for k, country in df.items():
for k,v in country.items():
countries.append(v)






abi = json.loads('[{JSON format for a ’contracts interface}]')
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address = "0xa84580e93474b942b48B16CAEeaA1920962CBd90"
contract = web3.eth.contract(address = address, abi = abi)
print(contract)








































abi = json.loads('[{JSON format for a ’contracts interface}]')
address = "0xa84580e93474b942b48B16CAEeaA1920962CBd90"
contract = web3.eth.contract(address = address, abi = abi)
patient = Patient.objects.get(uid=uid)
patient.status = request.GET.get("status")















abi = json.loads('[{JSON format for a ’contracts interface}]')
address = "0xa84580e93474b942b48B16CAEeaA1920962CBd90"
contract = web3.eth.contract(address = address, abi = abi)
if request.method == 'GET':
patient = Patient.objects.get(uid=uid)
patient.status = request.GET.get("status")



















dt = pd.read_csv('contact/static/info/countries.txt', sep='\n')
countries = []
df = dt.to_dict()
for k, country in df.items():




Listing 12: Python class views.py for users application
def search_results(request):
dt = pd.read_csv('contact/static/info/countries.txt', sep='\n')
countries = []
df = dt.to_dict()
for k, country in df.items():




abi = json.loads('[{JSON format for a ’contracts interface}]')
address = "0xa84580e93474b942b48B16CAEeaA1920962CBd90"




message = 'No infected people'
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if lpatient[0] == 0 and lpatient[1] == postal and lpatient[4]
== country:
if lpatient[3] not in lhash and lpatient[2] != 'daleted':
lhash.append(lpatient[3])
counter = counter + 1
message = 'Infected people in your area are'
return render(request,'infected.html', {'countries':countries,
'infected_people': counter, 'message': message})
Listing 13: Python class models.py for for hospital application
from __future__ import unicode_literals
from django.db import models




Patient information in hospital database
"""
CHOICES = [(True, 'Infected'), (False, 'Cured'), ('Suspected',
'Suspected')]
uid = models.AutoField(primary_key=True)
user = models.ForeignKey(User, on_delete=models.CASCADE, default=1)
name = models.CharField(max_length=100, blank=False, default='')
surname = models.CharField(max_length=70, blank=False, default='')
address = models.CharField(max_length=256, blank=False, default='')
email = models.CharField(max_length=256, blank=False, default='')
city = models.CharField(max_length=70, blank=False, default='')
region = models.CharField(max_length=70, blank=False, default='')
postal = models.CharField(max_length=70, blank=False, default='')
country = models.CharField(max_length=70, blank=False, default='')
phone = models.CharField(max_length=70, blank=False, default='')
status = models.CharField(max_length=20, choices=CHOICES,
null=True, default='')
notes = models.TextField(null=True, blank=True)
created_at = models.CharField(max_length=70, blank=False,
default='')
hashing = models.CharField(max_length=100, blank=False, default='')
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